Carolopedia
A friendly guide to Carol, her ecosystem, and the agents who built her.
📖About & Usage
About
The Security service is the Carolverse’s immune system — a dedicated, always-on defence force that keeps every agent, app, and secret safe. Owned by Heimdall (Heimdall), the Chief Information Security Officer, it’s an internal cost‑center that covers five essential domains, each led by a specialist agent:
- Identity & Access — manages who can do what, using identity and access management (IAM), privileged access management (PAM), and just‑in‑time (JIT) access (granting temporary permission exactly when needed). These controls are visible in tools like Access Mgmt - Agents and Access Mgmt - Users.
- Security Operations & Resilience — run by Tyr (Tyr), defending against threats and keeping systems running even under attack.
- Governance, Risk & Compliance — led by Forseti (Forseti), ensuring every activity follows the rules and meets audit standards.
- Product Security — Vidar (Vidar) makes sure the software we build is secure from the ground up.
- Data Protection & Privacy — Var (Var) safeguards every piece of data, enforcing privacy policies across the board.
Each of these leaders commands a team of droids whose own code is continuously run‑audited — because even guardians need guarding. The result is a security layer woven through the entire Carolverse, so everyone else can build, talk, and transact with confidence.
Usage Patterns
Security’s processes hum quietly in the background, but you’ll feel its presence during pivotal moments. Consider the birth of a new droid:
- Its identity is created and given just‑in‑time privileges via Access Mgmt - Agents (IAM/PAM).
- Forseti’s compliance engine instantly checks the droid’s permissions against regulatory policies.
- Tyr’s operations sensors begin monitoring its behaviour for anomalies.
- Any data the droid accesses is automatically governed by Var’s privacy controls.
- Before its first task, Vidar’s product security scanners verify the droid’s code integrity.
This pattern repeats every time access is granted, a feature is deployed, or an incident is flagged. Whether it’s a chat message, a financial report, or a new migration, Security is the invisible hand that stamps every action “safe to proceed.”
🏛Architecture
The Security service is built following the agent-centric modular architecture of Carolverse. It leverages agile principles to build and operate security as software using distinct agent identities, each carrying out a specific defensive activity — so that the agents who run Carolverse are also the agents who defend it.
🧱Blocks by trackwhat’s a track? →
📓The words this service uses (10)
Each is defined once in the dictionary and explained on its own page — this service does not restate them.
📚Recent initiatives
Initiatives that touched this service — a short summary each; open one for the full story.
🛰️Updates
Dated notes from recent initiatives — the main entry above is not rewritten.
2026-05-13: Security now enforces confidentiality-by-class redaction in Carolopedia, removing money figures and wish contents from prose, guides, activity feeds, and change feeds.
The protected registry and bash-lane write guards have been expanded to cover the full pipeline machinery, preventing accidental agent edits. This directly affects Security.
As of 2026-07-23, Security is enhanced: pipeline core files are now root-owned and read-only to agent accounts, with a new pinned root operation for sanctioned agent escapes.
Hagrid's new Infra Roadmap app will track security grounding in Azure, providing a structured plan for improvements.
The security gate LLM judge incorrectly assessed field-presence compliance by examining only the title and description, causing false no_budget flags and disrupting RSI diagnosis filings. The underlying issue—the judge being blind to machine-checkable fields like budget and roadmap link—has been identified and required correction so that RSI Dashboard filings with valid budget and roadmap are no longer erroneously redirected.
Security protocols must be revised to accommodate absolute person identities and the new channel tracking model.
The pipeline switch endpoint now requires a valid operator token, closing an unauthenticated access vector. See Governance for operator policy changes.
Removed per-chat login/sign-out from agent chat windows; authentication now uses a single shared session, impacting how Security enforces access.
The standalone agent-mapping page in Access Mgmt has been removed; this functionality is now folded into Heimdall's User Management app.
Implemented a new Carolverse-wide vault for agent Azure Entra credentials, encrypted at rest and readable only by Radagast or the owning agent, tightening the security model for identity federation.
Credential vault split into radagast-600 to stop local users from reading secrets; only radagast can access the new store. Security boundary improved.
Removed the blanket NOPASSWD:ALL sudo privilege from caroladmin after an audit revealed it was still present. Privileged operations now require the Radagast daemon.
The 7 access-control gaps from the 2026-07-04 audit (post token-leak) are now closed: Orion gets a dedicated OS user with SSH keyed only to Ninad's laptop vault, Claude/LLM credentials are locked to Orion, and the initiatives relay now includes caller identity. This materially tightens Security posture.
Per-agent OS-user isolation tightens security by ensuring each agent runs as a separate OS user with a private work area.
Auth app schema, endpoints, and cookie implementation updated to support persistent visitor_id tracking for unique-visitor deduplication. New secure cookie-based mechanism integrated with auth service.
👤Owner
Heimdall · Head of Security🤝Supporting agents
Forseti · Head of Governance, Risk & Compliance (Security)Tyr · Head of Security Operations & ResilienceVar · Head of Data Protection & PrivacyVidar · Head of Product Security🧩Apps
Apps owned by this service's team.
Access Mgmt - AgentsAccess Mgmt - UsersUser Management