The operating runbook is not published.
๐Summary
The Security service is built following the [agent-centric modular architecture](/dev/carolopedia/wiki/architecture) of Carolverse. It leverages agile principles to build and operate security as software using distinct agent identities, each carrying out a specific defensive activity โ so that the agents who run Carolverse are also the agents who defend it.
๐Functional considerations
Security is the connective tissue of the whole ecosystem, so its architecture is shaped by what it must guarantee end-to-end:
- **Defence-in-depth, not a single wall.** Identity & access, security operations, governance, product security, and data protection are independent layers; a failure in one must not collapse the others. - **Least privilege by construction.** Every agent can perform ONLY its own privileged work โ access is the exception that must be requested, granted, and expired, never the default. - **No standing privilege.** Powerful access is just-in-time: brokered on demand and torn down when the task ends, so there is no permanent attack surface to steal. - **Accountable by identity.** Every privileged action runs as a known OS identity and is verified before it executes, so each action is attributable to one agent. - **A gate on the way into production.** Build-time security and privacy review must sit on the path that ships code, so a change cannot reach production while bypassing the checks. - **Personal data stays isolated.** User memory and PII are partitioned per user and never leak across the boundary.
๐Solution architecture
The service is **defence-in-depth realised as blocks** โ the layers shown in the Blocks section of the service page โ each owned by a dedicated head and carried out by that head's run-audited droids. It is a direct instance of Carolverse's [agent-centric modular architecture](/dev/carolopedia/wiki/architecture): see the service's team and blocks above rather than a roster repeated here.
- **A structural identity foundation.** The registry RBAC schema (roles โ permissions โ grants) is the single layer that decides authorisation; every other surface reads it. - **Privileged execution through dedicated identities.** A locked OS user per agent owns that agent's privileged write surface; an owner-daemon runs as that user and only executes commands from a verified queue โ so privilege is split, attributable, and never blanket. - **Just-in-time access as the broker.** Powerful grants are issued on request, time-boxed, and auto-expire; standing access is the exception, not the rule. - **A build-time gate.** Product security and privacy review sit on the path into production, scanning for secrets, vulnerabilities, and PII exposure before a change ships. - **Continuous watch and recovery.** Session and threat monitoring, incident response, and resilience drills run on a schedule so detection and recovery are part of the system, not a manual afterthought. - **Governance closes the loop.** Policies, the risk register, periodic recertification, and segregation-of-duties enforcement keep the live grants honest against the rules.
๐Technologies
- **Python 3** services on **FastAPI** / **Flask** behind **nginx** โ the access-management and review surfaces. - **SQLite (WAL)** datastores. The **registry** holds the RBAC schema (roles, permissions, grants) and is the binding source of truth for who-may-do-what; the **design store** is the source of truth for what a service is allowed to look like. - A **credential vault** with rotation for secrets, and **just-in-time expiring grants** rather than long-lived credentials. - **systemd** / **cron** drive the recurring security droids (session monitoring, access recertification, scanning, resilience drills) with run-audited ticks. - The AI review steps run on the service's own lane, read from the registry when this page renders: **{{service_lane}}**. - **Git** holds the code under change; the build-time security gate reads the diff.
๐Design principles
- **Least privilege by default.** An agent gets exactly its own privileged surface and nothing more โ access is granted, not assumed. - **No standing privilege.** Powerful access is just-in-time and expires; there is no permanent grant to compromise. - **Separation of duties.** The agent that does the work is not the agent that authorises or recertifies it; defence is split across independent heads. - **Single source of truth.** Authorisation comes from the registry RBAC schema and design store, never hand-copied โ the shared principle described on the [Carolverse Architecture](/dev/carolopedia/wiki/architecture) page. - **Accountable by identity.** Every privileged action runs as a known OS user through a verified queue, so it is attributable to one agent. - **Shift left.** Security and privacy review gate the build, catching issues before production rather than after. - **Agent-centric modular architecture.** Every defensive layer has an accountable agent and a doing droid.
๐Success criteria
- **No agent can perform another agent's privileged work** โ each is confined to its own OS identity and write surface. - **Every privileged action is attributable** to one agent and was verified before it ran. - **No change reaches production** without clearing the build-time security and privacy review gate. - **Personal data never crosses the user boundary** โ memory and PII stay isolated per user. - **The live grants match the rules** โ periodic recertification finds no orphaned or excess access.
๐Policies
- **Access is just-in-time and time-boxed** โ standing grants require explicit governance approval and are recertified periodically. - **The RBAC schema in the registry is the only authorisation source** โ surfaces read it; they do not hold their own copy. - **Security and privacy review gate the build** โ a change that fails the gate does not ship. - **Segregation of duties** โ the agent doing the work cannot self-authorise or self-recertify it. - **PII and user memory stay isolated** โ cross-user access is denied by default.
๐What it delivers today
- **Per-agent OS identities and privileged execution.** Locked per-agent users with owner-daemons serving a verified request queue, so each agent does only its own privileged work โ Radagast's User Management layer (the User Management head in the blocks above). - **Identity & access platform.** The registry RBAC schema, just-in-time expiring access, and the credential vault with rotation โ run directly by the owner, [Heimdall](/dev/carolopedia/wiki/agent/agt-038). - **Security operations and resilience.** JIT brokering and expiry, continuous session and threat monitoring, incident response, and business-continuity / disaster-recovery drills โ [Tyr](/dev/carolopedia/wiki/agent/agt-039)'s SecOps block. - **Governance, risk and compliance.** The security policy set, the risk register, periodic access recertification, and segregation-of-duties enforcement โ [Forseti](/dev/carolopedia/wiki/agent/agt-040)'s GRC block. - **Product security.** The build-time security review gate, secret and vulnerability scanning, and supply-chain security โ [Vidar](/dev/carolopedia/wiki/agent/agt-041)'s ProdSec block. - **Data protection and privacy.** PII guarding, user-memory isolation, data classification and retention, and the privacy review gate โ [Var](/dev/carolopedia/wiki/agent/agt-042)'s Data Protection block.
๐What it will deliver
- Auto-recertification that proposes and files revocation initiatives for orphaned or excess grants rather than only flagging them. - A unified threat-and-access dashboard spanning all six layers. - Periodic, scheduled resilience (disaster-recovery) drills with audited outcomes feeding the risk register. - Tightening JIT windows further so the default grant lifetime shrinks toward the minimum a task needs.
Source: Services Catalogue ยท Public information reflected here.